Duquesne Law Review
Volume 37

Number 1

Article 8

1998

Bankruptcy Law - 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) - Exceptions to
Discharge
Derek J. Ferace

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Derek J. Ferace, Bankruptcy Law - 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) - Exceptions to Discharge, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 143
(1998).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol37/iss1/8

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

BANKRUPTCY LAW-11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)-EXCEPTIONS TO
DISCHARGE-The United States Supreme Court held that when a
debtor incurs a debt for punitive damages awarded as a result of the
debtor having fraudulently obtained money, property, or services and the
debtor subsequently seeks relief from all his debts by filing for bankruptcy, that punitive damage award will not be dischargeable under §
523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Cohen v. DeLa Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212 (1998).
In September 1989, Edward S. Cohen ("Cohen"), the owner of
several residential properties in New Jersey, was notified by a local rent control administrator that he had been charging rents in
excess of those allowed under a local rent control ordinance.' He
was subsequently ordered to refund the excess to his tenants.2 As a
result of the order to pay his tenants, Cohen was unable to pay his

other creditors and filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code on November 21, 1990.'

On February 11, 1991, the tenants initiated an adversary proceeding against Cohen.4 They sought a declaration that the debt
owed to them was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A) because it had been obtained by fraudulently charging rents in excess of those permitted under the Hoboken Rent
Control Ordinance.' The tenants also sought treble damages, at1. Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1215 (1998).
2. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1213. The Hoboken Rent Control Administrator determined
that Cohen had charged Hilda De La Cruz, Nelfo C. Jimenez, Maria Morales, Gloria Sandoval, Hector Santiago, Santio Santos, Elba Saravia, Elvia Siquenzia, and Enilda Tirado
rents in excess of those permitted under a rent control ordinance and ordered him to
refund $31,382.50 to these tenants. In re Cohen, 185 B.R. 171, 173 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
3. Cohen, 185 B.R. at 173.
4. In re Cohen, 191 B.R. 599, 603 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d 52 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. granted,sub nom., Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997), affd 118 S. Ct.
1212 (1998). An adversary proceeding is defined as "a proceeding involving a real controversy contested by two opposing parties." Barron's Law Dictionary 14 (3d ed. 1991).
5. Cohen, 191 B.R. at 603. section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code reads as
follows:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for money,
property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to
the extent obtained by ... false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insiders
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torney's fees,
and costs pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer
6
Act.
Fraud
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey found that Cohen had committed actual fraud within the meaning of section 23(a)(2)(A).7 The court also declared that Cohen's
conduct amounted to "unconscionable commercial practice" under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.' Therefore, the tenants
were awarded treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus reasonable
attorney's fees and costs.' In holding that the debt incurred as a
result of Cohen's fraudulent act was nondischargeable, the court
determined that the actual fraud element of section 523(a)(2)(A)
was satisfied by Cohen's failure to investigate the accuracy of the
rent charges, which demonstrated a disregard for the truth and an
intent to deceive. °
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that treble damages are
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A)." The District Court
held that, because the treble damages were mandated by New Jersey law, those damages were entirely foreseeable by Cohen at the
time he made the false representations.12 Therefore, Cohen's liability can be seen as debt incurred through conduct, rather than as
punishment.2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision by accepting the bankruptcy court's determinations that Cohen had committed fraud under both section
523(a)(2)(A) and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and that
both compensatory and treble damages incurred as a result of that
fraud are nondischargeable."4 The court concluded that the treble
financial condition. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1996).
6. Cohen, 191 B.R. at 603. N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 reads in pertinent part:
[Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real
or personal, as a result of the use of a practice declared unlawful by this
Act may bring an action ...
[and] . . . the court shall, in addition to any
other legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages (treble damages) to the person in interest . . . In all actions under this section the
court shall award reasonable attorney's fees and costs."
Cohen, 185 B.R. at 188 (quoting N.J.S.A. § 56: 8-19 (1994)).
7. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1215.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Cohen, 185 B.R. at 178-79.
11. Cohen, 191 B.R. at 609.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In re Cohen, 106 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1997). In his appeal, Cohen asserted that: (1) the
bankruptcy court and the district court applied incorrect principles of law in concluding
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damages portion of Cohen's liability represented "debt . . . for

money, property, services, or... credit, to the extent obtained by.
. actual fraud."'" The court further explained that the phrase "to
the extent obtained by" modifies "money, property, services, or...
credit."'" As a modifier, the phrase distinguishes not between compensatory and punitive damages awarded for fraud but, rather,
between money or property obtained through fraudulent means
and money or property obtained through nonfraudulent means.'7
Because Cohen obtained the money through fraudulent means, his
entire debt was nondischargeable.'8
Judge Greenberg dissented, concluding that punitive damages
are dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) because they "do not
reflect money, property, or services the debtor obtained."'9 Judge
Greenberg added that if Congress had intended for punitive damages to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A), the statute would read that "a discharge... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for false pretenses or a false representation."2 Judge Greenberg concluded by noting that if punitive damages are not to be dischargeable, then there is no need for the
"money, property or services ...to the extent obtained by" provision of section 523(a)(2)(A).2'
Cohen subsequently petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari,' which was granted.' The issue considered
that his conduct amounted to nondischargeable fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A); (2) even if
his conduct amounted to fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), it did not constitute fraud under
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; and (3) the treble damages provision of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act is a punitive award and is therefore dischargeable under §
523(a)(2)(A). Id.
15. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1215. The Court concluded that the term "debt,"def'med in 11
U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) as a "right to payment," plainly encompasses all liability for fraud,
whether in the form of compensatory or punitive damages. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Court concluded that the entire award of $94,147.50 (plus attorney's fees
and costs) resulted from money obtained through fraudulent means and is therefore
nondischargeable. Id.
18. Id.
19. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1215. Judge Greenberg concluded that the phrase "to the
extent obtained by," referring to "money, property, or services," makes it clear that punitive damages are dischargeable because they are something the debtor pays rather than
obtains. Cohen, 106 F.3d at 59.
20. Cohen, 106 F.3d at 60. Judge Greenberg found that this reading would be consistent with treating punitive damages as part of the debtor's "debt." Id.
21. Id. Judge Greenberg opined that punitive damages "are simply a penalty and are
something a debtor pays rather than obtains. Cohen, 106 F.3d at 60. Judge Greenberg
further reasoned that Cohen obtained only the overcharges in rent, which are reflected
in the compensatory damages. Id.
22. A writ of certiorari is "issued from a superior court to one of inferior jurisdiction,
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by the Supreme Court was "whether § 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of treble damages awarded on account of debtor's fraudulent acquisition of 'money, property, services, or ... credit,' or
whether the exception to discharge only encompasses the value of
the 'money,
property, services or ... credit' obtained through
'
24
fraud."
Justice O'Connor, who delivered the opinion for the Court, began her analysis of the issue by stating that the Bankruptcy Code
has long prohibited the discharge of liabilities incurred on account
of fraud and that the Code embodies a basic policy of affording
relief to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."25 Justice O'Connor
then concluded that section 523(a)(2)(A) continues that tradition
by excepting from discharge "any debt ... for money, property,
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the
extent obtained
by... false pretenses, false representations, or
2
actual fraud."
In interpreting section 523(a)(2)(A), Justice O'Connor explained
that the most straightforward reading of this section is that it prevents from discharge "any debt" respecting "money, property, services, or... credit" that the debtor fraudulently obtained, including
treble damages assessed on account of the fraud.27 In analyzing
why treble damages fall under section 523(a)(2)(A), Justice
O'Connor held that the obligation to pay treble damages satisfies
the threshold obligation that it constitute a "debt."8 Justice
O'Connor then confirmed that a "debt" is defined in the Code as a
"liability on a claim" and that a "claim" is defined as a "right to
payment. " ' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined "right to
payment" as "nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation. ' Therefore, an award of treble damages is an enforceable
commanding the latter to certify and return to the former the record in a particular
case." Barron's Law Dictionary 66 (3rd ed. 1991). "The writ is issued in order that the
court issuing the writ may inspect the proceedings and determine whether there have
been any irregularities." Id.
23. Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997).
24. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1214-15.
25. Id. at 1216 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), and Brown v. Felsen,
442 U.S. 127 (1979)).

26. Id.
27. Id.
The Court cited Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995), which described §
523(a)(2)(A) as barring from discharge debts "resulting from" or "traceable to" fraud. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1216.
30. Id. The Court quoted 11 U.S.C. §101(12) for the definition of "debt" as a "liability
on a claim," 11 U.S.C. §101(5)(A) for the definition of. "claim" as a "right to payment,"
and PennsylvaniaDepartment of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990), for
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obligation of the debtor, and a creditor has a corresponding right
to payment."
Justice O'Connor then accepted the Third Circuit's interpretation that the phrase "to the extent obtained by" makes clear that
the share of money, property, etc., that is obtained by fraud gives
rise to a nondischargeable debt. 2 Once it is established that money
or property has been obtained through fraud, any debt arising
therefrom is excepted from discharge.' Justice O'Connor then
concluded that, because Cohen received rent payments in excess
of those allowed under a local rent control ordinance by fraud, his
total liability traceable to that fraud, $94,147.50 plus attorney's fees
and costs, falls within the exception.'
Finally, in addressing the issue of whether the exception only
encompasses the value of the money or property obtained by
fraud, Justice O'Connor held that the various exceptions to discharge in section 523(a) reflect the conclusion on the part of Congress "that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of
debts in these categories outweighs the debtor's interest in a fresh
start."' Justice O'Connor further explained that if the exception
only barred discharge of the value of any money, property, etc.,
that was fraudulently obtained by the debtor, then the objective of
ensuring full recovery would be ill served. ' The Supreme Court
provided the following example of this in its opinion: "if a debtor
fraudulently represents that he will use a certain grade of shingles
to roof a house and is paid accordingly, the cost of repairing the
resulting water damage to the house could far exceed the payment
to the debtor."37 In this regard, Justice O'Connor held that Cohen's
the definition of "right to payment" as "nothing more or less than an enforceable obligation." Id. In this case, the Supreme Court held that these definitions reflect Congress'
broad view of the class of obligations that qualify as a "claim" giving rise to a "debt." Id.
at 2130-31.
31. Id. at 1216.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1216.
35. Id. at 1218 (quoting Grogan,498 U.S. at 287). Section 523(a) does not discharge
an individual debtor from, inter alia, any of the following debts: tax or customs duty;
fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity; to a spouse or. child of the
debtor; willful or malicious injury by the debtor to another; a fine payable to a governmental unit; education loan payments; and death or personal injury as a result of
debtor's operation of a motor vehicle. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
36. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1218. The Court reasoned that limiting the exception to the
value of money or property fraudulently obtained by the debtor could prevent even a
compensatory recovery for the losses occasioned by fraud. Id.
37. Id.
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entire debt of $94,147.50, which stems from his fraud, is nondischargeable.'
The history of section 523(a)(2)(A) dates to the nineteenth century, when the only debts excepted from discharge where those
owed to the United States.' Fraudulent debts became nondischargeable by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.' Section 523(a)(2)(A)
of the current code was derived from section 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, which listed specific debts that would be excluded
from discharge once they were proven.4 Section 17(a)(2)of the
Bankruptcy Act was not substantially changed until 1978, when 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) was enacted.' This section modified section
17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act by (1) adding actual fraud as a
ground for exception to discharge; (2) requiring not only that the
creditor rely on a false statement in writing, but also that the reliance be reasonable; and (3) deleting the phrase "in any manner
whatsoever" that appears after "made or published" as unnecessary, with the word "published" being used in the same sense that
it is used in defamation cases.' In 1984, the phrase "to the extent
obtained by" was added to section 523 by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act."
One of the first cases dealing with the dischargeability of punitive damages awarded pursuant to debtor fraud was In the Matter
of Cheatam.' In this case, the debtor was found guilty of fraudulently altering an odometer on an automobile that he had sold and
38. Id. at 1219.
39. Lawrence P. King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.01(15th ed. 1995).
40. Id.
41. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1217. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §17a(2) reads in pertinent
part:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses and false representations, or for obtaining money and property on credit or obtaining an
extension or renewal of credit in reliance on a materially false statement
in writing respecting his financial condition made or published or caused
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with the intent to deceive, or for willful conversion of the property of another.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). As part of the Reform Act of 1978, paragraph (2) of this
section provided that "a debt for obtaining money, property, services, or a refinancing,
extension, or renewal of credit by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
or by use of a statement in writing respecting the debtor's financial condition that is
materially false, on which a creditor has reasonably relied, and which the debtor made
or published with the intent to deceive, is excepted from discharge." Id.
43. Id.
44. King, supra note 39, 523.08.
45. 44 B.R. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984).
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subsequently incurred a judgment debt because of that fraud.' It
was the determination of the court that the actions by the debtor
rendered the debt nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).47
However, the court held that only the portion of the debt that reflects actual damages sustained by the creditor may be nondischargeable.' The court further added that the portion of the debt
that was in the form of punitive damages was dischargeable because the court would not punish the unsecured creditors by substantially depleting the estate to pay for a wrong committed by the
debtor.4 9 Therefore, it was the conclusion of the court that the
maximum loss suffered by the buyer of the automobile was the
amount actually paid for the automobile.' The court, in the interest
of fairness to the unsecured creditors, discharged the remaining
portion of the debt.'
Another decision that held that punitive damages were dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) was In re Ellwanger 2
In this case, the debtor, who was administratrix of her mother's
estate, fraudulently excluded a family residence from the probate
estate.' The probate court ordered the residence returned to the
estate and imposed a penalty of twice the value of the property
against the debtor.' The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
held that this penalty against the debtor was dischargeable under
section 523(a)(2) because if the creditor were to receive payment
of this debt, he would more than be made whole, he would receive
a windfall.' Therefore, it was the determination of the court that
46. Cheatam, 44 B.R. at 5. The debtor was ordered to pay $9,000.00 to the buyer of
the fraudulently altered vehicle; $7,100.00 of this amount was in the form of punitive
damages. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court quoted In re Ryan, 15 B.R. 514, 520 (Bkrtcy. Md. 1981) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 1st Sess. 382 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787), which
found that "the intent of Congress was that unsecured creditors should be protected
from the debtor's wrongdoing." Id.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Cheatam, 44 B.R. at 9.
52. 105 B.R. 551 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989).
53. EUwanger, 105 B.R. at 552. A debtor recorded a quitclaim deed after her mother's
death; the deed purported to give the debtor the family residence when the family residence was supposed to be part of the probate estate with all the assets therein to be
divided equally among the family. Id.
54. Id. The probate court ordered a debtor to pay $240,000.00, or twice the amount of
the property, pursuant to Cal. Prob. Code §612, which imposes a penalty of twice the
value of the property on any person that has withheld, embezzled, or concealed property
of a decedent from the estate. Id.
55. Id. at 555-56. The court stated that the penalty imposed on the debtor did not
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because the punitive damages awarded were, by nature, penal, and
not compensatory, the debt was dischargeable under section
523(a)(2).6
In In re Levy57 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language of section 523(a)(2) as suggesting that this subsection limits nondischargeability to the amount of the benefit to the debtor or of the
loss to the creditor.' In holding that punitive damages stemming
from a debtor's fraud are dischargeable, the Levy Court explained
that punitive damages represented neither losses to the victim of
the fraud nor increases in wealth of the debtor who engaged in the
fraud. 9 Furthermore, because punitive damages are awarded as as
a penalty or punishment and to deter others, they are dischargeable as a debt not incurred by fraud.'
In the case of In re Sciscoe,"' the court interpreted section
523(a)(2)(A) as precluding from discharge only the amount of
money that was obtained by fraud.' In Sciscoe, the debtor fraudulently obtained money to be put "in trust" for plaintiffs and converted it for his own use.' Subsequently, punitive damages and
attorney's fees were awarded by a state court default judgment.'
In this regard, the court concluded that the punitive damages and
attorney's fees awarded in the state court were not "obtained by
the debtor and are dischargeable as they were not obtained by
false pretenses, false misrepresentation, or actual fraud. " '
The most recent case to hold that punitive damages are disincrease the amount of money or property that was obtained by actual fraud and that §
523(a)(2), as an exception to discharge, impairs the debtor's fresh start and should not
be read more broadly as to effectuate the policy against debtors avoiding debts incurred
as a result of their actual fraud. Id. at 555-56.
56. Id. at 556.
57. 951 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1991).
58. Levy, 951 F.2d at 198. The court reasoned that the 1984 amendment to this section adding the phrase "to the extent obtained by" was meant to limit the amount of
nondischargeable debt to the amount "obtained by actual fraud." Id.
59. Id. In this case, the jury awarded $53,538.94 in compensatory damages and
$250,000.00 in punitive damages for breach of employment contract and misrepresentation. Id. at 197.
60. Id. (quoting In re McDonald, 73 B.R. 877, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)).
61. 164 B.R. 86 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1993).
62. Sciscoe, 164 B.R. at 88. The court concluded that § 523(a)(2)(A) discharges debt
only to the extent money was obtained by false pretenses, false misrepresentation, or
actual fraud. Id.

63. Id. at 87.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court held that the damages, interest, and fees may have been caused by
the debtor's fraudulent behavior but that no reasonable construction of statutory terms
would equate "cause" with "obtain" in §523(a)(2)(A). Id.

1998

Cohen v. De La Cruz

chargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A) is In re Auricchio.66 In
this case, the debtor incurred a debt of punitive and compensatory
damages as a result of his fraudulent inducement of investors to
purchase worthless properties. 7 The court in this case determined
that punitive damages are dischargeable because the "to the extent
obtained by" phrase in section 523(a)(2)(A) places a cap on the
amount of debt that may be excepted from discharge and limits
discharge to only the amount of debt that was fraudulently obtained.' To read punitive damages into this exception would render the precise statutory language a nullity.'
In contrast, cases such as In re Guy have held that punitive
damages are not dischargeable under section 523 (a)(2)(A).' In
this case, the debtor fraudulently converted investor funds for his
personal use.' A prepetitionjudgment was entered against the
debtor for both compensatory and punitive damages arising from
his breach of contract.' The Guy Court reasoned that, when a prepetition judgment awarding punitive damages results from a trial
on the merits and the judgment has collateral estoppel effect, the
punitive damages are nondischargeable if they were proven by
competent, clear, and convincing evidence at trial. The court explained that the principal purpose of section 523 is to penalize the
dishonest debtor for his misdeeds.74 Therefore, the court held that
punitive damages are nondischargeable. 5
In In re Tobman,6 the court found that punitive damages are
66. 196 B.R. 279 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
67. Auricchio, 196 BR. at 291. The damages were $16,397.77 and there was an unsecured claim against the estate worth $7,084.00. Id.
68. Id. at 290.
69. Id. The court concluded that, under general principals of statutory construction,
courts are to attempt to give meaning to all of the statutory language. Id.
70. 101 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
71. Guy, 101 B.R. at 987.
72. Id. The prepetition judgment was for compensatory damages of $20,369.39 in
principal balance plus $17,737.48 in prejudgment interest and $8,000.00 in punitive damages. Id. at 992.
73. Id. at 996. The court noted that the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code (a
policy in which an honest debtor is entitled to discharge of his debts for a fresh start)
should have no application to a debtor who has committed a nondischargeable act that
is so grievous that, after a full trial on the merits, the court, with a full opportunity to
observe the witnesses, awards punitive damages based on clear and convincing evidence. Id.
74. Id. The court found that punitive damages were not inconsistent with the policy
of the Code because they are a penalty for the dishonest debtor, which is within the
purpose of § 523. Id.
75. Id.
76. 96 B.R. 429 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) when both the punitive damages and compensatory damages flow from the same
course of fraudulent conduct.' In this case, the debtor used
fraudulently acquired monies to pay off his personal debts.'8 It was
the determination of tis court that, because the debtor incurred a
nondischargeable debt of compensatory damages from the fraud
and the debt from the punitive damages imposed against the
debtor stemmed from the same course of conduct, the punitive
damage award was also nondischargeable.79
The most famous case to hold that punitive damages are not dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) is In re St. Laurent.' In this
case, the debtor fraudulently conveyed property free and clear of
any encumbrances when, in fact, there was a mortgage on the
property from which no release had been obtained." After receiving payment for the conveyance, the debtor used the proceeds for
his personal use rather than to satisfy the mortgage.' The state
court found the debtor liable for fraud and awarded the purchasers
of the property both compensatory and punitive damages.' The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that punitive damages are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) because
they flow from the same course of fraudulent conduct that necessitated an award of compensatory damages.' The court further
held that the meaning of the word "debt" in section 523(a)(2)(A) is
broad enough to include punitive damage awards because a creditor who establishes the requisite elements of fraud under section
523 is entitled to the whole of any debt that he or she is owed by
the debtor.' Finally, the court added that the "fresh start" policy of
77. Tobman, 96 B.R. at 439. Tobman was found guilty of fraudulent inducement, willful conversion, and violation of Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
for fraudulently obtaining money that was given to him for the purpose of buying stock
in a company and using it to pay off his own debts. Id.
78. Id. at 431. Because the debtor fraudulently acquired monies provided to him for
the purpose of buying stock in debtor's business, as well as for making loans to the
same, he was ordered to pay $287,500.00 in compensatory damages, $100,000.00 in punitive damages, $5,742.02 in costs, and $38,748.44 in accrued interest. Id.
79. Id. at 441.
80. 991 F.2d 672 (1lth Cir. 1993).
81. St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 674.
82. Id. After the debtor defaulted on the mortgage, the mortgage holder filed a foreclosure action on the property, and the owners of the conveyance filed a cross-claim
against debtor for fraud. Id. at 675.
83. Id. The state court awarded the purchasers of the property $48,705.22 in compensatory damages and $50,000.00 in punitive damages. Id.
84. Id. at 678.
85. Id. The court reasoned that the language "to the extent obtained by" did not limit
the breadth of the definition of debt because it does not distinguish actual damages from
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the Bankruptcy Code is not hampered by the nondischargeability
of punitive damages because punitive damages are imposed only
on culpable defendants and not on the honest but unfortunate
debtor.' Therefore, because the award of punitive damages arose
from the same fraudulent act that produced compensatory damages and because the debtor's fraudulent act was so grievous that
he was not entitled to a fresh start, the award of punitive damages
is nondischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2)(A)."7
In re Winters' was one of the first cases to follow the rationale
in St. Laurent.' In this case, both compensatory and punitive
damages were awarded as a result of the debtor's fraudulent misrepresentation about the quality of construction of a particular
house.' In Winters, the court adopted the approach of the St.
Laurent Court and decided that the term "debt" in section
523(a)(2)(A) is sufficiently broad to encompass punitive
damages.9 In this regard, the court concluded that the debt for pufrom the
nitive damages is nondischargeable because it flowed
2
damages.1
compensatory
yielded
that
same conduct
In Cohen, the Supreme Court validates those cases holding that
punitive damages are nondischargeable pursuant to section
523(a)(2)(A) by concluding that the statute prevents discharge of
any debt that the debtor fraudulently obtained including treble
damages.' The Court is correct. A debt incurred should not be limited to the monetary benefit received by the debtor because the
benefit to the debtor may far exceed any determinable monetary
punitive damages but, rather, distinguishes contractual debts tainted with fraud from
debts for breach of contract. Id. at 679.
86. St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 680. The court quoted In re Dvorak, 188 B.R. 619 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1990), which held that the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy, which is to give
relief to the honest and unfortunate debtor by allowing him or her to discharge all debts,
should not apply to the debtor who has committed a nondischargeable act so grievous
that after a full trial on the merits the trier of fact awards punitive damages appropriate.

Id.
87. Id. at 681.
88. 159 B.R. 789 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 1993).
89. St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672.
90. Winters, 159 B.R. at 789. At the conclusion of the trial for fraudulent misrepresentation, the jury rendered a verdict of $25,150.00 in compensatory damages and $
10,000.00 in punitive damages, finding Winters guilty of misrepresentation and failing to
disclose certain defects in connection with the selling of a house. Id.
91. Id. at 790. The court, in confirming that the word "debt" in § 523(a)(2)(A) does
encompass punitive damages, cited St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, which provided that "a
common cause of fraudulent conduct is a 'debt' as defined by the Bankruptcy Code in §
523(a)." Id.

92. Id.
93. Cohen, 118 S.Ct. at 1216.
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value. For instance, a debtor may have fraudulently obtained
money for years and used that money to invest in what turned out
to be a profitable investment. To limit nondischargeability to the
amount of money fraudulently obtained by the debtor would permit the debtor to profit from the fraud. This result would be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code policy of allowing the honest but
unfortunate debtor an opportunity for a fresh start because, in this
case, the debtor obtained the debt and all the profit associated
with it dishonestly and, therefore, should not be permitted the
same protection under the Bankruptcy Code as is someone who
honestly encountered financial difficulties.'
The Supreme Court differentiates its decision from those cases
that have held that punitive damages are dischargeable by interpreting section 523(a)(2)(A) as barring discharge of any debts "resulting from" or "traceable to" fraud.95 This reasoning is quite different from the holding in cases such as In re Levy," which limited
the nondischargeability to the amount of the benefit to the debtor
or the amount of loss to the creditor.97 This latter interpretation
could potentially leave a creditor inadequately compensated for
his injuries.' Furthermore, if punitive damages are intended as
punishment, then allowing a discharge of punitive damages would
negate the penal effect. In turn, this would decrease the deterrent
effect on other debtors.
In addition, the Court recognizes that the phrase "to the extent
obtained by" in section 523(a)(2)(A) does not pose any limitation
on the amount of debt arising from fraud that is to be excepted
from discharge. Rather, section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge any debt that arises from fraudulently obtaining money,
property, services, etc.' Therefore, all debt incurred through fraud,
94. St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 680. The court held that "a debtor attempting to abuse
the bankruptcy proceedings is not entitled to the medley of the bankruptcy protections."
Id. (quoting TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1991)).
95. Cohen, 118 S.Ct. at 1216 (quoting Field, 516 U.S. at 61, 64).
96. 951 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.1991).
97. Levy, 951 F.2d at 198.
98. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1219. The Supreme Court provides an example of how a creditor could be inadequately compensated by quoting from an amicus curiae brief filed by
the United States, which reasoned that, when "a debtor who fraudulently represents to
aircraft manufacturers that his steel bolts are aircraft quality, which he knows are not,
[and] obtains $5,000.00 for the bolts and then, because the bolts are not aircraft quality,
they cause a multi-million dollar airplane to crash," the $5,000.00 benefit to the debtor
would not begin to compensate the aircraft manufacturers for the loss associated with

the crash. Id.
99. Id. at 1216. The Court determined that "any debt" arising from the specific money
or property obtained by fraud, including treble damages awarded pursuant to the fraud,
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including the benefit obtained by the debtor, as well as any treble
or punitive damages awarded, is nondischargeable pursuant to
section 523(a)(2)(A).
Reading the statute differently would limit the recovery of the
injured creditor while allowing the dishonest debtor to escape responsibility for his fraud. Moreover, it would be incorrect to read
section 523(a)(2)(A) as Judge Greenberg did and declare that
treble damages are not something the debtor "obtained" and,
therefore, are dischargeable." To the contrary, a debtor obtains
treble or punitive damages as punishment when he fraudulently
obtains money, property, or services because the debtor incurs
these damages as a result of his or her fraudulent acquisitions. It is
hard to conceive that a debtor could obtain punitive damages in
the same manner that he or she fraudulently acquires money, because punitive damages are not obtained directly from the creditor. They are, in fact, obtained as punishment for the use of fraud
and benefit from fraudulently acquired funds. Therefore, although
punitive damages are not obtained directly from the creditor, they
are nonetheless obtained through fraud.
Finally, the courts need not declare punitive damages dischargeable to prevent the bankruptcy estate from being depleted to protect unsecured creditors.' This is so because the risk of not being
repaid is inherent in being an unsecured creditor. In Cohen, the
Supreme Court correctly looks beyond protecting the unsecured
creditors to remedy the greater evil of letting the less-than-honest
debtor discharge a debt incurred as a result of the use of fraud to
acquire money, property, or services." In this regard, the Supreme
Court's ruling does not prevent unsecured creditors from being
compensated, rather, it provides adequate compensation to those
creditors with claims against the debtor for fraud.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Cohen overrules a long line
of cases that held that punitive damages were dischargeable under
section 523(a)(2)(A). By so doing, the Supreme Court sends a message to all those who have committed fraud or may commit fraud
in the future: if a debtor is found guilty of obtaining money, propis nondischargeable. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
100. Cohen, 106 F.3d at 60. Judge Greenberg reasoned that Cohen only obtained the
money from the overcharged rent and the amount received from that act should be the
extent of the nondischargeable debt. Id.
101. Cheatam,44 B.R. 4.
102. Cohen, 118 S. Ct. at 1216. The Court concludes that § 523(a)(2)(A) carries on the
tradition of the Bankruptcy Code of only affording relief to the honest but unfortunate
debtor. Id. at 1216.
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erty, or services through the use of fraud and this determination
results in a punitive damage award, the bankruptcy process will be
no place to escape liability for the entire debt incurred. Therefore,
the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen allows those victims of
fraud who have subsequently become judgment creditors to receive total compensation for their injuries by not permitting debtors to discharge the debt incurred for punitive damages.
Derek J. Ferace

